生产商规模不经济下低碳供应链的决策与协调

Decision Making and Coordination of Low Carbon Supply Chain

摘要:

生产商规模不经济属性是经济社会常见现象，但其对于低碳供应链减排与定价决策的影响较少得到关注。借助博弈论建立低碳供应链在集中决策和分散决策两种模式下的决策模型，并设计收益共享-成本分担契约对生产商规模不经济且分散决策下低碳供应链成员的决策行为进行协调。结果发现：在集中决策或分散决策模式下，随着生产商规模不经济属性的增强，低碳供应链单位产品的碳减排力度均减少，供应链整体利润均下降，产品零售价格的变化趋势取决于产品碳系数的大小；在生产商规模不经济且分散决策下，低碳供应链中存在决策效率损失，且损失的大小受生产商规模不经济强度和消费者碳偏好程度的共同影响；当收益分享比例和成本分担比例满足一定条件时，实施收益共享-成本分担契约可以实现生产商规模不经济且在分散决策下低碳供应链完全协调。

Abstract:

The diseconomies of scale nature of the producers is a common phenomenon in the economy and society, but its impact on low-carbon supply chain emission reduction and pricing decisions has received less attention. By means of game theory, this paper establishes a decision-making model of low-carbon supply chain in the mode of centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making, and designs the revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contract to coordinate the decision-making behavior of low-carbon supply chain members under the diseconomies of scale and decentralized decision-making of producers. The results show that under centralized or decentralized decision-making mode, with the increase of the diseconomies of producers’ scale, the carbon emission reduction intensity of unit product is gradually reduced, the total profit of supply chain is gradually decreased, and the change of retail price depends on carbon coefficients of products; and there is a loss of decision-making efficiency in low-carbon supply chains under diseconomies of scale and decentralized decision of producers, which is affected by the intensities of both diseconomies the scale of producers and consumers’ carbon preferences; besides, when the revenue sharing ratio and cost sharing ratio meet certain conditions, the revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contract can realize the complete coordination of low-carbon supply chain under decentralized decision making.