企业绿色技术转型：需求、竞争与政策——基于多阶段博弈模型的研究

Firms’ Green Technology Transformation: Demand, Competition, and Policy—— Research Based on a Multi-stage Game Model

摘要:

企业绿色技术研发与转型是实现我国“双碳”目标的关键。除了来自消费者对节能环保等绿色特征产品的市场需求以及企业间市场竞争的驱动之外,企业绿色技术转型还受到来自政府部门政策的助推。构建一个多阶段多寡头博弈模型,研究企业在市场需求、市场竞争以及政府政策三方面作用下的绿色技术转型决策机制。在市场需求不确定的条件下,模型中设计了一个政府部门的相机行动策略,即当绿色市场需求较高时,政府部门采取严格标准的环境规制策略,而当绿色市场需求较低时,政府部门采取对绿色特征产品价格补贴的政策策略。企业对政府的事后管理决策的预期,影响企业的事前投资决策。这个博弈模型的设计符合以市场为主导,国家宏观调控的经济管理模式。首先证明了该博弈纳什均衡的存在性,并提供找到纳什均衡的算法。然后通过算例分析政府采取相机策略的作用,结果表明相机政策策略比单一的确定性政策有助于激励更多企业发生绿色技术转型。

Abstract:

Firms’ green technology R D and transformation is critical to achieve the carbon peak and neutrality goals. In addition to the market demand from consumers for energy-saving and environmentally-friendly products and market competition among firms, the green technology transformation of firms is also boosted by government policies. The mechanism of green technology transformation is studied incorporating the three aspects of market demand, market competition, and government policy by constructing a multi-stage oligopoly game model. Under market demand uncertainty, government sector takes a contingent policy strategy in this model. That is, the government will take a regulation to tighten a standard on a pollutant when the green market is high, and it will subsidize on the price of the green characteristic product when the green market demand is low. Firms ex ante investment strategy will be influenced by their expectation on the ex post management of the government. The design of this game model conforms to the economic management mode of market-oriented and national macro-control. The existence of Nash equilibrium of the game is proved, and an algorithm of finding a Nash equilibrium is provided. The role of contingent strategy played by the government is analyzed using a computational example. The results show that using the contingent strategy encourages more firms to perform the green technology transformation than using a single deterministic policy.