双碳目标下的岸电减排决策研究

Research on the Emission Reduction Decision of Shore Power under Carbon Peak and Neutrality Goals

摘要:

船舶靠港使用岸电，是减少港口污染物排放的有效手段，也是双碳目标下绿色港口发展的必然要求。从供应链视角，利用博弈方法，构建政府补贴政策下，港口和船舶采用岸电减排的博弈模型，分析三种权力结构（船舶主导、港口主导，港口与船舶处于同等地位）下的港口与船舶减排决策行为。结果表明：港口与船舶处于平等地位情形下的政府补贴最小；当岸电接电时间较短时，一方处于主导地位的港航供应链整体利润最大；而当岸电接电时间较长时，港口与船舶处于平等地位的港航供应链整体利润最大。三种权力结构下的排放量和社会福利是一样的。

Abstract:

The shore power is an effective way to reduce pollutant emissions in ports,and is an inevitable requirement for the development of green ports. From the perspective of the supply chain, the game models between port and ship using shore power are constructed under government subsidy policies.The reduction decision of the supply chain and the subsidy strategies of government are analyzed in three cases：ship is the dominant?player; port is the dominant?player; port and ship are both the dominant?players. The results show that, the subsidy where the port and ship are both the dominant?players is the smallest. When the shore power connection time is short, the overall profit of the supply chain where one party is the dominant player is the largest. When the shore power connection time is long, the overall profit where the port and the ship are both dominant player is the largest . The emissions and social welfare in the three power structures are the same.