政府研发补贴、高管团队职能背景多样性与企业研发投入

Government R&D Subsidies, Diversity of Top Management Team Functions and R&D Investment of Enterprises

摘要:

基于高阶梯队理论与信息决策理论,以2008-2018年中国A股上市公司非平衡面板数据为研究样本,探究了政府研发补贴对企业研发投入的影响以及高管团队职能背景多样性对政府研发补贴效应的调节作用。研究结果显示,政府研发补贴对企业研发投入有显著的正向影响,并且该促进作用在非国有企业组中更加明显。整体而言,高管职能背景多样化有利于政府研发补贴政策效应的发挥,激励企业增加研发投入,但其影响效果也会受到企业性质和企业规模的影响。研究结论可为进一步优化政府研发补贴政策制定和实施提供微观经验证据和理论依据。

Abstract:

Based on the high echelon theory and information decision-making theory, this paper takes the unbalanced panel data of China"s A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2018 as the research sample to explore the impact of Government R D subsidies on Enterprise R&D investment and the regulatory role of the diversity of executive team function background. The results show that government R&D subsidies have a significant positive effect on R&D investment, especially in non-state-owned enterprises. Overall, the diversification of executive function background is conducive to the effect of Government R&D subsidy policy, which encourages enterprises to increase R&D investment, but the effect is also affected by the nature and scale of enterprises. The conclusions can provide micro empirical evidence and theoretical basis for further optimizing the formulation and implementation of government R&D subsidy policies.