政府补偿方式、所有制性质与企业技术创新失败再创新

Government Compensation, Enterprise Ownership and Re-innovation of the Enterprise Innovation Failure

摘要:

本文实证分析了政府补偿对企业技术创新失败再创新的作用机理。研究结果显示:（1）政府直接补偿与间接补偿均能提升再创新绩效，且直接补偿效果更显著；（2）企业所有制性质存在调节作用，国有性质强化了直接补偿效果而弱化了间接补偿效果；（3）政府直接补偿与企业再创新的R&D投入存在倒“U”型关系，即直接补偿存在临界值，临界以下表现为补偿溢出效应，临界以上则为补偿挤出效应。而政府间接补偿对企业再创新的R&D投入表现为补偿溢出效应。以上结果拓展了政府补偿方式影响企业再创新行为的研究视野，为政府制定基于创新容错的失败补偿政策与再创新激励政策提供了新思路。

Abstract:

This paper empirically analyzed the impact of government compensation on re-innovation of the enterprise innovation failure. The results showed that re-innovation performances can be improved by both direct government compensation and indirect compensation, and the effect of direct compensation was more significant. The enterprise ownership had a regulatory effect that the influence by state-owned enterprises on the direct compensation effect was more obvious than that on the indirect compensation effect. And further tests showed that there existed an inverted U-shaped relationship between the direct compensation and R&D investment in re-innovation. That was, there was a critical value for direct compensation, below which the compensation showed as spillover effect, while above the critical value the compensation showed as crowding-out effect. Moreover, the government indirect compensation for R&D investment in enterprise re-innovation manifested as a spillover effect. These results extended the research of government compensation on the enterprise re-innovation, and provided a new way for the compensation policy on innovation failure and incentive policy on re-innovation based on innovation fault tolerance.