政府R&D补贴分配策略探讨：创新“主力军”与“国家队”之争

Allocation Strategy of Government R&D Subsidy: Competition between Innovation “Main Force” and “National Team”

摘要:

本文针对如何将政府有限的R&D补贴资金在创新“主力军”（企业）与创新“国家队”（科研机构）之间进行“最优”分配这一重要问题进行解答。通过构建涉及“政府-企业-科研机构”三部门的三阶段动态博弈模型，理论探寻政府补贴最优分配策略，探究行业规模、产研合作、技术溢出等一系列因素对政府R&D补贴制定和实施的影响。研究证实：只有当溢出效应达到或超过一定水平时，政府才会对企业实施R&D补贴，并且伴随溢出效应的增大，政府会提升补贴预算资金中向企业投放的比例；产研合作不仅有利于强化市场企业与科研机构的研发投入的意愿，还有益于企业利润、消费者福利以及社会福利水平的提升。较高程度的产研合作会增强政府向科研机构实施R&D补贴的意愿而降低政府对企业研发的支持力度。

Abstract:

This paper aims at solving the important problem of how to optimally allocate the limited R&D subsidy funds between the innovation “main force” (enterprises) and the innovation “national team” (scientific research institutions). By constructing a three-stage dynamic game model involving “government-enterprise-scientific research institution”, the optimal allocation strategy of government subsidies is explored theoretically, and the influence of a series of factors such as industry scale, industry-research cooperation and technology spillover on the formulation and implementation of government R&D subsidies is explored. The research proves that only when the spillover effect reaches or exceeds a certain level, the government will implement R&D subsidy to enterprises, and with the increase of the spillover effect, the government will increase the proportion of subsidy budget funds to enterprises. Industry-research cooperation not only strengthens the willingness of market enterprises and research institutions to invest in R&D, but also improves corporate profits, consumer welfare and social welfare level. A higher degree of industry-research cooperation will enhance the government's willingness to subsidize R&D to research institutions and reduce the government’s support to enterprise R&D.