产学研合作对专利质押融资信号失灵问题的作用分析

The Effect of Industry-University-Research Collaboration on Patent Pledge Financing Signal Failure

摘要:

专利估值困难是金融机构办理专利质押融资业务的主要障碍。低技术企业通过伪装专利使金融机构无法通过贷款信号确认其技术水平，由此出现“专利信号失灵”问题。通过信号博弈模型对该现象的成因及危害进行分析，并对产学研合作与专利质押融资之间的相互作用机制进行研究。结果表明，产学研合作有助于减少专利质押市场中借贷双方的信息不对称性，从而缓解“专利信号失灵”造成的市场效率低下问题。对此，建议积极完善产学研合作平台建设，将产学研合作作为帮助金融机构识别可靠专利信号的重要考量，同时对尚未有高质量专利产出但正与高水平科研团队进行科技合作的中小企业提供更多元化的融资渠道。

Abstract:

The difficulty of patent valuation is the main obstacle for financial institutions to handle patent pledge financing business. By disguising patents, low-tech companies prevent financial institutions from confirming their technological level through loan signals, which has led to the problem of "patent signal failure". This paper analyzes the cause and harm of this phenomenon through a signal game model, then discusses the interaction mechanism between industry-university-research collaboration and patent pledge financing. The results show that industry-university-research collaboration can help reduce the information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders in the patent pledge market, thereby alleviating the market inefficiency caused by “patent signal failure”. On the other hand, patent pledge financing can also have a positive impact on the decision-making of industry-university-research collaboration of science and technology enterprises. In this regard, it is recommended to actively improve the construction of industry-university-research cooperation platforms, take industry-university-research collaboration as an important consideration to help financial institutions identify reliable patent signals. At the same time, more diversified financing channels should be provided to small and medium-sized enterprises that do not yet have high-quality patent output but are engaged in technological cooperation with high-level scientific research teams.