产学研协同模式下关键核心技术创新演化与驱动研究
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上海大学

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F204;F224;G301

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上海市“科技创新行动计划”软科学重点项目“长三角关键核心技术产业链诊断及“龙头”效应研究——以集成电路为例”(21692111300);上海市“科技创新行动计划”软科学重点项目“长三角关键核心技术攻关的模式驱动与上海引领——以集成电路为例”(22692104900)


Research on the Evolution and Driving of Key Core Technology Innovation Under the Model of Industry-University-Research Collaboration
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    摘要:

    针对“关键核心技术创新突破”焦点问题,考虑创新过程的动态性特点、关键影响因素及其作用机制,以企业和学研机构为博弈主体构建产学研协同模式下关键核心技术创新演化博弈模型,系统探讨影响博弈双方合作策略选择的关键因素及其驱动机制,并结合数值仿真揭示各因素变动下协同创新系统的演化轨迹。结果表明:政策激励因素能够促进企业与学研机构协同创新,但不同政策措施的影响效果具有差异;降低合作成本和“搭便车”收益,提升合作收益增量能够促进协同创新;盲目设置过高的创新深度而使研发成功率过低无助于双方合作;企业对学研机构的研发资助、违约金、机会损失和声誉损失以及合理的利益分配系数能够有效抑制中途背叛行为的发生。基于此,提出优化政府政策组合、鼓励企业牵头组建创新联合体、完善体制机制设计等建议,从而为政府科学施策、精准施策,推动解决关键核心技术“卡脖子”问题提供实践参考。

    Abstract:

    Aiming at the focus issue of key core technology innovation breakthrough, taking into account the dynamic characteristics of the innovation process, key influencing factors and their mechanisms, this study takes enterprises and academic institutions as the game players to construct a key core technology innovation evolutionary game model under the industry-university-research collaboration model; systematically explores the key factors and driving mechanism that affect the choice of cooperation strategies between the two players in the game, and combines numerical simulations to reveal the evolution trajectory of the collaborative innovation system under changing factors. The results show that: policy incentives can promote collaborative innovation, but the effects of different policy measures are different; reducing the cost of cooperation and free-riding benefits, and increasing the incremental benefits of cooperation can promote collaborative innovation; blindly setting an excessively high innovation depth and making the R&D success rate too low will not help the cooperation between the two parties; R&D funding, liquidated damages, opportunity loss, reputation loss, and reasonable profit distribution coefficients of enterprises to academic and research institutions can effectively restrain the occurrence of betrayal behavior . Based on the findings, we propose to optimize the combination of government policies, encourage enterprises to lead the formation of innovation consortia and improve the design of institutional mechanisms, so as to provide practical reference for the government's scientific and precise policies to promote the solution of stranglehold problems on key core technology.

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许学国,吴鑫涛.产学研协同模式下关键核心技术创新演化与驱动研究[J].,2023,(4).

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  • 收稿日期:2022-06-26
  • 最后修改日期:2023-02-27
  • 录用日期:2022-08-26
  • 在线发布日期: 2023-03-28
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