Abstract:Aiming at the focus issue of key core technology innovation breakthrough, taking into account the dynamic characteristics of the innovation process, key influencing factors and their mechanisms, this study takes enterprises and academic institutions as the game players to construct a key core technology innovation evolutionary game model under the industry-university-research collaboration model; systematically explores the key factors and driving mechanism that affect the choice of cooperation strategies between the two players in the game, and combines numerical simulations to reveal the evolution trajectory of the collaborative innovation system under changing factors. The results show that: policy incentives can promote collaborative innovation, but the effects of different policy measures are different; reducing the cost of cooperation and free-riding benefits, and increasing the incremental benefits of cooperation can promote collaborative innovation; blindly setting an excessively high innovation depth and making the R&D success rate too low will not help the cooperation between the two parties; R&D funding, liquidated damages, opportunity loss, reputation loss, and reasonable profit distribution coefficients of enterprises to academic and research institutions can effectively restrain the occurrence of betrayal behavior . Based on the findings, we propose to optimize the combination of government policies, encourage enterprises to lead the formation of innovation consortia and improve the design of institutional mechanisms, so as to provide practical reference for the government's scientific and precise policies to promote the solution of stranglehold problems on key core technology.