政府补贴与企业物流智慧化升级的演化博弈
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中南财经政法大学

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国家社会科学“中国物流产业智慧化的高质量发展效应与政策支持研究”(批准号:20BJY188)。


Evolutionary game between government subsidies and intelligent upgrading of enterprise logistics
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    摘要:

    企业物流智慧化升级是“技术—功能—管理—组织—服务”智慧化的演进过程,政府补贴能否能加速企业物流智慧化升级值得研究。在相关假设的基础上,本文通过构建企业物流智慧化与政府补贴升级决策的演化博弈模型,重现博弈主体的动态演进过程。研究结果表明,企业与政府存在三个可能的均衡状态,分别是{物流智慧化升级,补贴}、{维持现阶段水平,不补贴}、{物流智慧化升级,不补贴}。演化博弈系统的研究受到8个相关因素的干扰,这些因素通过影响政府和企业的收益发生作用。在理论推导的基础上,本文选取成本、补贴力度和税收优惠力度三个因素进行数值分析加以验证。

    Abstract:

    The intelligent upgrading of enterprise logistics is the evolution process of "technology function management organization service". Whether government subsidies can accelerate the intelligent upgrading of enterprise logistics is worth studying. Based on the game hypothesis of the evolution of government subsidy, this paper constructs a dynamic model related to the evolution of enterprise subsidy. The results show that there are three possible equilibrium states between enterprises and the government, namely {Logistics Intelligent upgrading, subsidy}, {maintain the current level, no subsidy}, {Logistics Intelligent upgrading, no subsidy}. The research of evolutionary game system is disturbed by eight related factors, which affect the income of government and enterprises. Based on the theoretical derivation, this paper makes a numerical analysis on the assignment of relevant factors to verify the correctness of the derivation. The conclusions of this paper are as follows: among the four possible equilibrium points of the game between the government and enterprises, there are three conditional stability points (0,1), (1,1) and (1,0). When the relative net income of a strategy in the strategy concentration is positive, the relevant subjects will prefer to choose the strategy, there is no strategy selection (the enterprise maintains the existing logistics level and the government does not subsidize);The results of numerical simulation analysis show that the reduction of the cost of Enterprise Logistics Intelligent upgrading can greatly improve the enthusiasm of Enterprise Logistics Intelligent upgrading and promote enterprises to carry out logistics intelligent upgrading spontaneously without government intervention; Increasing the amount of subsidies or tax incentives can’t significantly improve the enthusiasm of enterprise logistics intelligence, but may lead to the government's own financial crisis. Therefore, the government's intervention in the intelligent upgrading of enterprise logistics needs to grasp the strength. We should comprehensively consider the current situation of the intelligent upgrading of enterprise logistics and our own financial situation, and set up the amount of government subsidies and tax incentives suitable for enterprises and governments.

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刘仁军,周欣.政府补贴与企业物流智慧化升级的演化博弈[J].,2023,(4).

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  • 收稿日期:2022-06-26
  • 最后修改日期:2023-03-04
  • 录用日期:2022-08-31
  • 在线发布日期: 2023-03-28
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