低碳视角下制造企业产能共享的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Manufacturing Enterprises' Capacity Sharing from the Perspective of Low Carbon

摘要:

为研究低碳视角下制造企业产能共享策略，本文基于低碳视角，构建了“产能共享平台-产能提供方-产能需求方”的三方演化博弈模型，对系统的演化策略稳定性进行分析，并分析了低碳产品补贴的共享比例、高碳产品罚金的共担比例、平台提供服务水平的高低程度对演化结果的影响。结果表明：提供方选择参与产能共享的概率与其获得低碳产品补贴的共享比例成正比，与其支付高碳产品罚金的共担比例成反比；需求方选择生产低碳产品的概率与提供方获得低碳产品补贴的共享比例、提供方支付高碳产品罚金的共担比例均成反比；提供方选择参与产能共享的概率与提供方的信息化程度系数成正比；平台提供高服务水平时，提供方选择参与产能共享的概率更大。

Abstract:

In order to study the capacity sharing strategy of manufacturing enterprises from the perspective of low carbon, this paper constructed a three-party evolutionary game model of "capacity sharing platform - capacity provider - capacity demander" based on the perspective of low carbon, and analyzed the stability of the evolution strategy of the system. The effects of subsidy sharing ratio of low-carbon products, fine sharing ratio of high-carbon products and the level of service provided by the platform on the evolution results are analyzed. The results show that the probability of suppliers choosing to participate in capacity sharing is directly proportional to the sharing proportion of low-carbon product subsidies, and inversely proportional to the sharing proportion of paying fines for high-carbon products. The probability of the demand side choosing to produce low-carbon products is inversely proportional to the sharing proportion of the supplier side getting subsidies for low-carbon products and the sharing proportion of the supplier side paying fines for high-carbon products. The probability of the provider choosing to participate in capacity sharing is proportional to the information degree coefficient of the provider. When the platform provides high service level, providers are more likely to participate in capacity sharing.