Abstract:The government's strategy for allocating scientific and technological resources will directly affect the basic research behavior of research institutes. The essential feature of two-party behavioral strategies is the game interaction between basic research participants to maximize their own interests. However, few studies have focused on how to coordinate the strategic choices of government and research institutes in the development of basic research to maximize the interests of all parties. Therefore, it is reasonable and necessary to analyze the interaction between government funding allocation strategies and basic research behavior of research institutes from the perspective of game theory. To this end, comprehensively considering the impact of the reform of China's funding allocation mechanism and the increase in total funding on the basic research behavior of research institutes, an evolutionary game model for the interaction between government and research institutes is constructed, and the main factors that affect the evolutionary stability strategy are simulated. The results show that building an effective and stable support mechanism rather than simply increasing the total amount of funding is a necessary condition for research institutes to focus on the main responsibilities; different government interventions have heterogeneous effects on the strategy choices of game subjects, and the impact of R&D subsidies is limited with weaker sensitivity than budget deductions and research awards; factors such as the initial willingness of government and the degree of collaborative innovation among institutions also significantly affect the convergence speed of the game system to the ideal state. These enlighten our government to implement a differentiated funding model for research institutes and universities, give full play to the stimulating role of punitive incentives and research awards on research subjects, and promote benign interaction between research institutes and universities.
