董事绿色联结与绿色技术创新——基于重污染企业绿色并购的实证研究

The Impact of Board Green Interlocks on Green Technology Innovation: An Empirical Study Based on Green M&A of Heavy Polluters

摘要:

以2012-2020年我国沪深A股重污染行业上市公司为研究对象，实证检验董事绿色联结对绿色并购后绿色技术创新的影响，并探究不同类型的环境规制对这一关系的差异性作用。研究发现：(1)董事绿色联结显著促进重污染企业绿色并购后的绿色技术创新；(2)命令控制型环境规制负向调节董事绿色联结与企业绿色并购后绿色技术创新之间的关系，市场激励型环境规制U型调节两者之间的关系。异质性分析表明：董事绿色联结对重污染企业绿色并购后绿色技术创新的促进作用在非国有企业、高研发投入企业以及高竞争度行业更为显著。因此在进行绿色并购重大决策时，企业应重视董事绿色联结这一非正式制度，发挥其企业间信息通道的作用，促进重污染企业进行绿色技术创新。

Abstract:

Using 2012-2020 listed companies in China's heavy pollution industry in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares as the research object, we empirically test the effect of board green interlocks on green technological innovation after green M&A and explore the differential moderating effect of different types of environmental regulations on this relationship. It is found that (1) board green interlocks significantly promotes green technology innovation after green M&A of heavy polluting firms; (2) command-and-control environmental regulations negatively regulate the relationship between board green interlocks and green technology innovation after green M&A of firms, and market-incentive environmental regulations U-regulate the relationship between the two. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the promotion effect of board green interlocks on green technology innovation after green M&A in heavy polluting firms is more significant in non-state owned enterprises, high R&D investment firms and high competitive industries. Therefore, when making major decisions on green M&As, firms should pay attention to the informal system of board green interlocks and play its role as an inter-firm information channel to promote green technology innovation in heavy polluting firms.