基于演化博弈的产业生态链理论研究 ——以半导体产业为例

Theoretical Research on Industrial Ecochain Based on Evolutionary Game: Evidence from the Semiconductor Industry

摘要:

半导体产业技术密集程度高、创新链条长，因而研究我国半导体产业联盟的协同积极性问题需从更为广阔的产业生态链视角展开。以产业生态链理论为分析框架，从生产方、学研方和服务方角度构建半导体产业生态链三方演化博弈模型，探究影响产业生态链稳定发展的各项要素；同时，基于我国半导体上市企业2016－2021年我国半导体上市企业的面板数据对博弈模型进行仿真分析。研究发现：产业生态链的协同运作受各主体不同策略行为的共同作用，与协同收益相比，各方对成本的变化更敏感，且生产方与学研方积极合作意愿对配套服务企业策略选择的影响相对较大；成本和收益分配机制影响主体的参与意愿，且存在最优的收益分配系数使生产方与学研方采取协同策略的意愿最强；配套服务价值的增加虽然提高了产业协同收益，但难以促进各方积极合作；提高产业创新效益并约束主体行为是促进半导体产业生态链积极合作运行的关键。因此，需在以按劳分配为主体的同时，强化政府对于产业生态链的引导与支持，建立健全产业生态链利益分享机制。

Abstract:

The high technological intensity and long innovation chain of the semiconductor industry necessitate a broader perspective on investigating the collaborative willingness within China's semiconductor industry alliance. Using the industrial ecochain theory as an analytical framework, a three-party evolutionary game model of the semiconductor industrial ecochain is constructed from the perspectives of production, research, and service, aiming to explore the various factors affecting the stable development of the industrial ecochain. Additionally, a simulation analysis of the game model is conducted based on panel data from Chinese semiconductor publicly listed companies between 2016 and 2021. The study reveals that the collaborative operation of the industrial ecochain is influenced by the combined actions of different actors. In comparison to collaborative benefits, the parties are more sensitive to changes in costs. Moreover, the willingness of production and research entities to cooperate significantly impacts the strategic choices of service companies. Cost and benefit distribution mechanisms affect the willingness of the actors to participate, and there exists an optimal benefit distribution coefficient that maximizes the willingness of production and research entities to adopt collaborative strategies. While an increase in the value of supporting services enhances collaborative benefits in the industry, it does not significantly promote active cooperation among the parties. Thus, enhancing industrial innovation efficiency and constraining actor behaviors are crucial for promoting the proactive operation of the semiconductor industrial ecochain. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen government guidance and support for the industrial ecochain, while also establishing a robust mechanism for sharing the benefits of the industrial ecochain, primarily based on the principle of remuneration according to work contribution.