Abstract:Based on the assumptions of bounded rationality and incomplete information among the participants, this study constructs an evolutionary game model of disruptive technology adoption behavior, with enterprises, consumers, and governments as the core entities. The model aims to analyze the stable strategies of the three parties in adopting disruptive technologies. Numerical simulation and MATLAB are employed to analyze and verify the specific evolutionary paths of the model, in order to explore the influencing factors that determine the final strategy choices of the three parties during the game of disruptive technology adoption behavior. The results indicate that: (1) The initial attitudes and adoption tendencies of enterprises, consumers, and governments toward disruptive technology products can influence the evolutionary paths and outcomes of the game system. (2) For disruptive technology companies, a higher proportion of production of disruptive technology products helps to shorten the adoption cycle and increases the government"s expectation of providing support to the enterprises. For the government, subsidies to enterprises that produce disruptive technology products prolong the technology adoption cycle. Moreover, if the government"s subsidies to these enterprises are too excessive, it may lead to the government eventually abandoning the subsidies. On the other hand, government assistance to consumers in purchasing disruptive technology products has a more pronounced effect in the early and middle stages of the technology adoption process compared to later stages.