制造业集群供应链内企业协同低碳创新行为演化 ——考虑环境规制与合作契约双重约束

Evolution of Collaborative Low Carbon Innovation Behavior among Enterprises in the Supply Chain of Manufacturing Clusters: Considering the Dual Constraints of Environmental Regulation and Cooperative Contracts

摘要:

鉴于当前在探讨制造业集群供应链上供应商与制造商协同低碳创新的行为演化时，将政府环境规制、链内企业合作契约及消费者绿色偏好3类因素同时纳入同一分析框架的研究还较为欠缺，为进一步促进我国制造业集群的绿色化转型，聚焦于集群供应链内供应商企业与制造商企业组成的二级结构，将政府行为、链内契约以及消费者反馈作为企业低碳创新策略选择影响因素，构建博弈模型分析双方的长期最优均衡策略，并通过案例数值仿真分析讨论关键参数对博弈系统演化路径的影响。结果发现：当供应商企业与制造商企业分别进行低碳创新后，消费者支付意愿增值、博弈企业双方共同低碳创新与单方企业低碳创新产生的收益增幅之差、碳税抵扣额、对方违约罚金这四者之和大于企业低碳创新研发净支出时，博弈双方的长期均衡策略均为{低碳创新}；当企业低碳创新研发净支出越低、违约处罚越高、消费者绿色偏好越强时，企业越倾向于选择{低碳创新}均衡策略；碳税税率变化对企业的均衡策略影响不显著。据此，提出制定科学的环境规制政策、构建合理的链内合作契约、着力培养消费者绿色偏好等对策建议。

Abstract:

Considering that there is currently a lack of research on the evolution of collaborative low-carbon innovation behavior between suppliers and manufacturers in the supply chain of manufacturing clusters, which includes three factors: government environmental regulations, intra chain enterprise cooperation contracts, and consumer green preferences, in the same analytical framework. In order to further promote the green transformation of China's manufacturing clusters, the focus is on the secondary structure composed of supplier enterprises and manufacturer enterprises in the cluster supply chain, Taking government behavior, intra chain contracts, and consumer feedback as factors influencing the selection of low-carbon innovation strategies for enterprises, a game model is constructed to analyze the long-term optimal equilibrium strategies of both parties. The impact of key parameters on the evolution path of the game system is discussed through case numerical simulation analysis. Through model deduction, it is found that when two types of enterprises engage in low-carbon innovation, the sum of the four of the increase in consumer willingness to pay, the difference in revenue growth between joint low-carbon innovation and unilateral low-carbon innovation by both parties in the game, the carbon tax deduction amount, and the penalty for breach of contract by the other party are greater than the net expenditure on low-carbon innovation research and development by the enterprise, the long-term equilibrium strategy of both parties in the game is {low-carbon innovation}; the numerical simulation results indicate that when the net expenditure on low-carbon innovation research and development is lower, the penalty for breach of contract is higher, and the consumer's green preference is stronger, the enterprise is more inclined to choose the {low-carbon innovation} equilibrium strategy; the change in carbon tax rate has no significant impact on the equilibrium strategy of enterprises. Based on this, countermeasures and suggestions are proposed for formulating scientific environmental regulation policies, constructing reasonable intra chain cooperation contracts, and focusing on cultivating consumer green preferences, in order to provide reference for achieving long-term collaborative low-carbon innovation between suppliers and manufacturers.