智能建管平台下工程总承包项目信息共享激励研究

Information Sharing Incentive for Engineering Procurement Construction Project under Intelligent Construction and Management Platform

摘要:

工程总承包（Engineering-Procurement-Construction，EPC）项目中信息共享是提高项目管理效率的关键因素之一，而智能建管平台的应用可以有效改善EPC项目中信息不对称现象，但是工程实践中存在总承包商信息共享的积极性不高的问题。针对这一问题，以业主方主导构建的智能建管平台为特定情境，运用演化博弈理论，构建业主方和总承包商之间的博弈模型，分析双方在信息共享激励过程中的策略选择并进行仿真研究，以探讨不同参数对总承包商信息共享行为的影响，以及影响双方策略选择的关键因素。结果发现：业主方额外收益越大、激励成本越低，业主方更倾向于采取激励策略；总承包商积极信息共享的潜在收益越大、消极信息共享的机会收益越小，总承包商更倾向于采取积极信息共享策略；总承包商的智能建管平台应用成熟度和对总承包商的补贴对双方的策略都有显著影响。基于此，指出业主方应从物质激励和声誉激励相结合、平台应用的不同时期应及时调整激励策略和辅以适当惩罚机制3个维度，来制定激励策略以促进总承包商积极共享信息。

Abstract:

Information sharing is one of the key factors to enhance project management efficiency in Engineering Procurement Construction (EPC) projects, as information management can provide effective data support and decision-making basis for engineering management activities such as optimizing resource utilization, controlling project schedules, and managing risks. The application of intelligent construction management platforms integrating various information technologies, represented by BIM technology, can effectively improve the asymmetry of information in EPC projects. However, the enthusiasm for information sharing among general contractors in engineering practice is generally low, leading to the inability of intelligent construction platforms to function effectively. Addressing this issue, this paper takes the scenario of intelligent construction management platforms initiated by the owner as a specific context, applies evolutionary game theory, constructs a game model between the owner and the general contractor, and conducts simulation studies on the strategic choices of both parties in the process of information sharing incentives. The owner's strategic choices include incentivizing or not incentivizing the general contractor for information sharing, while the general contractor can choose between active or passive information sharing. By varying different parameter values, this study explores the impact of different parameters on the general contractor's information sharing behavior and the key factors influencing the strategic choices of both parties. The results reveal that the greater the additional benefits for the owner and the lower the incentive costs, the more inclined the owner is to adopt incentive strategies. Similarly, the greater the potential benefits of active information sharing for the general contractor and the smaller the opportunity benefits of passive information sharing, the more inclined the general contractor is to adopt active information sharing strategies. The maturity of the general contractor's application of intelligent construction management platforms and subsidies from the owner significantly affect the strategies of both parties. Based on this, it is suggested that the owner should combine material incentives with reputation incentives, adjust incentive strategies in a timely manner according to the different stages of platform application, and supplement them with appropriate penalty mechanisms in order to promote active information sharing among general contractors.