Abstract:Disruptive innovation requires the collaborative involvement and deep cooperation of the government, enterprises, and consumers. Clarifying the game relationships and decision evolution mechanisms among these three parties is crucial for optimizing the environment for disruptive innovation and promoting enterprises to engage in such innovations. Based on game theory, this paper constructs a tripartite game matrix involving the government, enterprises, and consumers. It comprehensively considers the cooperative and competitive relationships among these parties, systematically analyzes their strategy choices and the equilibrium points of the game system, and uses numerical simulations to illustrate the evolution process of the game strategies. This analysis examines the strategy choices, evolution trends, and stable conditions of different game participants in disruptive innovation. The study reveals that short-term, small-scale subsidies can stimulate enterprises to undertake disruptive innovation, whereas long-term, substantial subsidies may lead to dependency on public resources and increase speculative risks. The government has a greater trial-and-error space in supporting disruptive innovation compared to enterprises but must also bear the financial pressure of subsidies. Consumer demand plays a decisive role in disruptive innovation, as products recognized by consumers can fundamentally influence enterprise decisions. Therefore, the government should cautiously assess the opportunities and risks of potential disruptive innovations, prioritize creating a favorable innovation environment, and fully leverage the decisive role of the market in disruptive innovation.