研发竞争环境下政府价格补贴策略的优化与效果分析

Optimization and Effects Analysis of Government Price Subsidy Strategies in R D Competitive Environments

摘要:

研发竞争关系普遍存在且对政府选择合适的创新补贴政策提出了新的挑战。文章把政府的价格补贴政策分为不补贴、补贴消费者估值高的产品、补贴消费者估值低的产品三种,建立了研发竞争环境下考虑创新活动特征的多主体博弈模型,分析了在鼓励社会创新过程中政府价格补贴的最优策略及其对企业创新行为的影响。研究发现:1)竞争激烈程度和创新活动特征是决定补贴政策适用条件的重要因素。当补贴政策与适用条件相匹配时,社会福利增加,反之社会福利减少；2)政府的价格补贴对于相互竞争的研发公司而言会形成顾此失彼的局面,但所有的价格补贴政策都有助于提升生产商的期望收益；3)补贴对于诸消费者剩余的影响则与具体的补贴额度相关。

Abstract:

R&D competition poses new challenges for the government to choose appropriate innovation subsidy policies. The article divides the government's price subsidy policy into three types: non-subsidies, subsidies for products with high consumer valuations, and subsidies for products with low consumer valuations, and establishes a multi-agent game model that considers the characteristics of innovation activities in a R&D competitive environment. The optimal strategy of government price subsidies in the process of encouraging social innovation and its impact on corporate innovation behavior are discussed. The study found that 1) the intensity of competition and the characteristics of innovative activities are important factors that determine the conditions for applying subsidy policies. When the subsidy policy matches the applicable conditions, social welfare increases, and vice versa, social welfare decreases; 2)the government's price subsidies can create a situation where competing R&D companies lose sight of the other, but all price subsidies can help increase the expected returns of producers; 3)the impact of subsidies on consumer surplus is related to the specific subsidy amount.