财政补贴对关键共性技术研发的创新效应及其作用机制

The Innovation Effects and Its Function Mechanism of R&D Fiscal Subsidies on Key Common Technology

摘要:

政府通过补贴来激励企业供给关键共性技术具有很强的经济合理性。在当前以芯片为代表的一系列“卡脖子”关键共性技术仍然未取得根本性突破的背景下，从实证层面研究关键共性技术研发补贴的创新效应，对于进一步改善科技财政预算绩效管理等方面具有重要的启示意义。以中国2009－2020年的上市公司数据为样本，运用交错双重差分模型，从专利数量和质量两个方面来检验财政补贴的创新效应及其异质性。研究发现：财政补贴有效提升关键共性技术专利数量，获得财政补贴的公司的关键共性技术专利数量要比未获得补贴的公司高6.9%，但是财政补贴对专利质量的影响不显著；财政补贴对关键共性技术专利数量的提升效应主要是通过激励企业增加研发资金投入而非研发人员投入来实现的；财政补贴对关键共性技术专利数量与质量的影响因行业、所有制和制度环境而异，具体来说，财政补贴能够提高技术密集型企业的专利数量和专利质量，对国有企业的专利数量提升作用高于非国有企业，提升了处于制度环境较好地区的企业专利数量。总体而言，财政补贴的专利质量效应还有待提升，应采取更具包容性的补贴甄选机制，筛选出外溢性更强、社会收益率更高、研发风险适度可控的项目进行补贴。

Abstract:

It is economically rational for the government to use subsidies to encourage companies to supply key common technologies. In the current context where a series of "bottleneck" key common technologies represented by chips have not yet achieved fundamental breakthroughs, empirically studying the innovative effects of R&D subsidies on key common technologies is of great significance for further improving science and technology budget performance management. Taking China's listed company data from 2009 to 2020 as a sample, a staggered difference-in-difference model was used to test the innovation effect and heterogeneity of fiscal subsidies from the two aspects of patent quantity and quality. The study found that fiscal subsidies effectively increased the number of key common technology patents. The number of key common technology patents of companies that received fiscal subsidies was 6.9% higher than that of companies that did not receive subsidies. However, the impact of fiscal subsidies on patent quality was not significant. The increasing effect of fiscal subsidies on the number of key common technology patents is mainly achieved by motivating enterprises to increase investment in R&D funds rather than R&D personnel. Moreover, the impact of fiscal subsidies on the quantity and quality of key common technology patents varies depending on the industry, ownership and institutional environment. Generally speaking, fiscal subsidies can increase the patent quantity and patent quality of technology-intensive enterprises, and have a greater effect on increasing the number of patents of state-owned enterprises than non-state-owned enterprises, and increase the number of patents of enterprises in areas with a better institutional environment. Overall, the patent quality effect of fiscal subsidies needs to be improved. To this end, it is recommended to build a more inclusive subsidy selection mechanism to screen out projects with stronger spillovers, higher social returns, and moderately controllable R&D risks for subsidies.