Abstract:With the improvement of the demand for the completeness of the industrial chain and innovation chain, it is more and more important for the state to master the key core technologies in the chain. In order to make full use of the innovation forces and innovation resources scattered in all walks of life in the past and accelerate the solution of the problem of key core technologies being controlled by others, many provinces and cities in China have actively explored the formation of innovation consortia for key core technologies in recent years. However, there is no mature theoretical system to support it in China, and there is a lack of goal-oriented research on key core technologies of local characteristic industries and analysis of dynamic changes in cooperation strategies. In view of these shortcomings, this paper constructs a theoretical model and a tripartite evolutionary game model with leading enterprises, governments and other cooperative subjects composed of small and medium-sized enterprises, universities and institutes as the main body, studies the stability strategy selection of the tripartite subjects, and takes the innovation consortium for the photonic industry in Shaanxi Province as an example to carry out simulation analysis of the game model. Leading enterprises take the lead in putting forward the basic proposition of forming an innovation consortium guided by the major needs of national key core technologies, government departments support and supervise the formation, and other cooperative entities with universities, institutes and small and medium-sized enterprises as members provide resources such as talent supply, technical support, and cutting-edge research information according to their own characteristics, and finally complete the research of key core technologies and the transformation of scientific and technological achievements. Based on this theoretical model, this paper puts forward the basic assumptions such as subject benefit, default penalty, and the probability of success of key core technologies in different scenarios, determines the benefit matrix and replication dynamic equation of the tripartite evolutionary game model, and analyzes the eigenvalues and stability strategy points of the model with the help of Jacobian matrix. In this paper, taking the innovation consortium led by Shaanxi Chasing Photonics Industry Pilot Innovation Center Co., Ltd. as a leading enterprise as an example, after obtaining data through the official website, using MatlabR 2022b software to analyze the initial cooperation willingness of the tripartite cooperation subjects, the success probability of key core technology research, the government support, the punishment for breach of contract, and the The specific analysis results of the influence of the income distribution coefficient on the evolution results are as follows: (1) the increase of the government's initial willingness to cooperate will have a positive impact on the cooperation willingness of the other two parties, and when the government's willingness to cooperate is lower than a certain threshold, the leading enterprises and other cooperative entities will no longer participate in the cooperation; The growth rate of cooperation willingness of other cooperative entities increases, and the impact of the initial cooperation willingness of other cooperative entities on the evolution results is less than that of leading enterprises. (2) The government's willingness to cooperate is very little affected by the probability of success in tackling key core technologies when leading enterprises and other cooperative entities participate, while the cooperation willingness of leading enterprises is more significantly affected by this probability change than that of other cooperative entities. (3) The increase or decrease of government support has a greater impact on the strategic changes of leading enterprises than on other partners, that is, leading enterprises and other cooperative entities can obtain fixed benefits by paying less costs, and leading enterprises are more concerned about the difference between benefits and costs when making decisions. (4) The penalty for breach of contract by the cooperative entity is an effective means to promote cooperation. With the increase of fines, the willingness of other partners to cooperate decreases faster than that of leading enterprises, that is, if the leading enterprises default in the cooperation, the impact on the willingness of the three parties to cooperate is much greater than that of other partners. (5) The decrease of the revenue distribution coefficient will lead to a significant decline in the willingness of leading enterprises to participate, which will then lead to a decrease in the probability of success in tackling key core technologies, and the income of other cooperative entities will also decrease, and finally make the willingness of both parties to cooperate tend to zero. Based on the above research results, this paper puts forward policy recommendations, including evaluating whether the innovation consortium is oriented to key core technologies, the difficulty and probability of success of key core technology research, supporting the acceleration of the incubation and cultivation of leading enterprises and improving the qualification and elimination mechanism of leading technology enterprises, providing real-time dynamic resource supply according to the needs of different stages in the whole process of cooperation, and building a multi-chain integrated innovation ecosystem. However, due to the limitations of the industry and research conditions of the research object, the parameter assignment in the simulation part of this paper can only reflect the typical situation of the industry, and our work does not have the universality to cover various industries.
