环境规制强度对企业漂绿行为的两阶段产品定价决策影响——以建材企业为例

How Different Environmental Regulatory Intensities Affect the Two-Stage Product Pricing Decisions of Enterprise Greenwashing Behavior: Taking Building Materials Enterprises as an Example

摘要:

建材企业漂绿行为阻碍了城乡建设绿色发展的进程。为了探究不同环境规制强度对建材企业漂绿行为的产品定价决策影响，基于溢出效应理论构建了建材企业绿色行为主导、建材企业漂绿行为跟随的两阶段Stackelberg博弈模型。并且，从不同环境规制强度视角出发，分析了无环境规制和有环境规制两阶段下企业的最优产品定价和最大利润。研究发现：（1）建材企业第一阶段的产品定价不会受到环境规制强度及漂绿程度的影响；建材企业第二阶段的产品定价与环境规制强度呈正相关、与漂绿程度呈负相关。（2）当环境规制强度高于阈值时，采纳漂绿行为的建材企业产品定价仅在第二阶段高于采纳绿色行为的建材企业产品定价。（3）当环境规制强度高于阈值时，不论建材企业是否采纳漂绿行为，企业第二阶段的产品定价始终高于第一阶段的产品定价。（4）建材企业第一阶段的利润不会受到环境规制强度的影响；环境规制会增大建材企业绿色行为第二阶段的利润，降低建材企业漂绿行为第二阶段的利润。因此，建议政府严格监督绿色建材的价格波动，实施与环境规制强度相匹配的价格监督措施。

Abstract:

Greenwashing behavior of building materials enterprises hinders the process of green development of urban and rural construction. In order to explore the impact of different environmental regulation intensities on product pricing decisions of greenwashing behavior of building materials enterprises, a two-stage Stackelberg game model was constructed based on the spillover effect theory in which green behavior of building materials enterprises leads and greenwashing behavior of building materials enterprises follows. Moreover, from the perspective of different environmental regulation intensities, the optimal product pricing and maximum profits of enterprises under two stages of no environmental regulation and with environmental regulation are analyzed. The research found that: (1) The product pricing of the first stage of building materials enterprises will not be affected by the intensity of environmental regulations and the degree of greenwashing; the product pricing of building materials enterprises in the second stage is positively correlated with the intensity of environmental regulation and negatively correlated with the degree of greenwashing. (2) When the intensity of environmental regulation is higher than the threshold, the product pricing of building materials enterprises that adopt greenwashing behavior is higher than the product pricing of building materials enterprises that adopt green behavior only in the second stage. (3) When the intensity of environmental regulation is higher than the threshold, regardless of whether the building materials enterprise adopts greenwashing behavior, the enterprise's product pricing in the second stage is always higher than the product pricing in the first stage. (4) The profits of building materials enterprises in the first stage will not be affected by the intensity of environmental regulation; environmental regulations will increase the profits of building materials enterprises in the second stage of green behavior and reduce the profits of building materials enterprises in the second stage of greenwashing. Therefore, it is recommended that the government strictly monitor price fluctuations of green building materials and implement price monitoring measures that match the intensity of environmental regulations.