政府监管行为对创新生态系统的影响分析

Analysis of the Impact of Government Regulatory Behavioron Innovation Ecosystem

摘要:

为了更好地发挥国家作为重大科技创新组织者的角色,健全社会主义市场经济条件下的新型举国体制,结合关键核心技术攻关任务急、周期长、风险高的现实背景,将以政府为主体的监督引导方作为独立主体融入创新生态系统,并赋予其新的时代内涵。在创新生态系统视角下,探讨分析各主体作用和利益诉求,建立主体间互动的逻辑框架,构建以知识技术为基础、以组织监督为纽带、以成果转化为核心、以用户需求为导向的知识供应方-技术转化方-监督引导方-用户需求方四方演化博弈模型。在有限理性假设下,从利益视角分析各博弈主体策略选择稳定性和系统整体演化趋势。通过演化博弈理论和微分定理找到可能存在的系统演化稳定点并进行稳定性分析,同时,借助计算机仿真手段厘清影响系统演化稳定性的关键因素。在系统演化趋势、不同初始策略选择概率影响模拟分析的基础上,重点对以政府为主体的监督引导方所涉及的参数影响进行模拟。模拟实验表明：系统演化趋势及过程符合分析结论,各博弈主体均在一个时间周期内达到稳态；提高知识供应方、监督引导方和降低技术转化方、用户需求方的初始策略选择概率有助于加快演化博弈速度并提高系统稳定性；就监督引导方而言：采取监管策略及降低非科研支出成本均对系统稳定性产生正面效应,然而加大政策奖惩力度则会加剧系统演化博弈波动程度,并改变系统均衡点位置。这是因为当其作为独立主体参与创新时,加大监管力度会间接影响自身成本,而在有限理性假设下会趋利避害并调整策略选择。尽管在面对紧急重大任务时可以不计成本保持在强监管状态下解决问题,但这种方式无法持久可行。因此,为形成长效稳定的创新生态系统,建议引入评估举措,并通过提高评估鉴别能力成为政府监管的有效补充手段,以支撑持续科研产出。

Abstract:

In order to better play the role of the state as the major organizer of scientific and technological innovation, improving the new state-owned system under the conditions of socialist market economy, combined with the realistic background of urgent tasks, long cycle and high risk of key core technologies, the supervision and guidance party with the government as the main body will be integrated into the innovation ecosystem as an independent subject, and give it a new connotation of the times. Based on the perspective of an innovative ecosystem, this study explores and analyzes the roles and interests of various stakeholders. It establishes a logical framework for the interaction among these stakeholders and constructs a four-party evolutionary game model. The model consists of knowledge suppliers, technology transfer agents, supervisory guides, and user demand parties. This model is based on knowledge and technology, linked by organizational supervision, centered around outcome transformation, and guided by user demands.Under the assumption of bounded rationality, this study analyzes the stability of strategy choices and the overall evolutionary trend of the system from the perspective of interests. It combines evolutionary game theory and differential calculus to identify potential stable points in the system and conduct stability analysis. Computer simulation is employed to clarify the key factors influencing the stability of system evolution.Based on the simulation and analysis of system evolution trends and the probability of different initial strategy choices, this study focuses on simulating the parameters related to the supervisory guidance provided by the government. The simulation experiments show that the evolutionary trend and process of the system are consistent with the analytical conclusions, and all game participants reach a steady state within one time period. Increasing the probability of initial strategy choices for knowledge suppliers and supervisory guides, while decreasing the probability for technology transfer agents and user demand parties, helps accelerate the speed of the evolutionary game and improve system stability.Regarding supervisory guidance, maintaining a strong regulatory state and reducing non-research expenditure costs have positive effects on system stability. However, intensifying policy incentives and penalties will increase the volatility of the evolutionary game and alter the equilibrium point of the system. This is because when the government, as an independent entity, participates in innovation, increasing regulatory efforts indirectly affect its own costs. Under the assumption of bounded rationality, it tends to seek benefits and avoid harm, adjusting its strategy choices accordingly. Although it is possible to temporarily maintain a strong regulatory state at any cost to address urgent and significant tasks, this approach is not sustainable in the long run. Therefore, to establish a sustainable and stable innovative ecosystem, it is recommended to introduce evaluation measures and enhance the government"s regulatory capacity through improved evaluation and identification abilities to support continuous research output.