科技自立自强背景下新型研发机构与社会资本联合投资策略研究 ——基于动态博弈模型的理论分析
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广东省科学院

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F830.592;G311;G301

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广东省基础与应用基础研究基金“双循环”新格局下风险资本支持科技成果转化体制机制创新研究资助项目;广东省科学院打造综合产业技术创新中心行动专项项目“广东省高质量发展理论方法与路径创新”(2023GDASZH-2023010101)


Research on joint investment strategy of new R&D institutions and social capital under the background of scientific and technological self-reliance-- Theoretical analysis based on dynamic game model
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    摘要:

    在风险投资实务中,联合投资是一种非常普遍且重要的策略选择行为。本文通过梳理新型研发机构与社会资本联合投资的内在机理,构建双边投资策略行为的演化博弈模型,运用MATLAB模拟基于主体价值最大化的双边投资策略选择,在此基础上,分析不同参数条件下联合投资概率的最优调节方法。研究发现:第一,缓解资金缺口、风险规避、资源互补是新型研发机构与社会资本构成辛迪加联合投资的内在动因;第二,新型研发机构与社会资本联合投的演化博弈系统具有复杂的路径依赖性,演化稳定状态取决于博弈双方策略选择的初始状态和关键参数调整机制。第三,进一步地通过控制参数中投资项目的合作收益、合作成本、风险系数、违约系数、政府补贴等因素提出了有效促进联合投资的建议。研究不仅丰富了新型研发机构资源配置与风险管控研究,与为对政府相关部门在制定决策时提供借鉴和参考。

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    Realizing high-level technological self-reliance and self-improvement is a necessary path to build a new development pattern of domestic and international dual circulation. How new research and development institutions can collaborate with social capital to optimize resource allocation capabilities is an important issue that urgently needs to be explored. In venture capital practice, joint investment is a very common and important strategic choice behavior. This article constructs an evolutionary game model of bilateral investment strategy behavior between new research and development institutions and social capital, uses MATLAB to simulate bilateral investment strategy selection, and analyzes the optimal adjustment method of joint investment probability under different parameter conditions. Research has found that: firstly, alleviating funding gaps, risk avoidance, and resource complementarity are the inherent driving forces behind the formation of syndicated joint investment between new research and development institutions and social capital; Secondly, the evolutionary game system of joint investment between new research and development institutions and social capital has complex path dependence, and the stable state of evolution depends on the initial state of strategy selection and key parameter adjustment mechanism of both parties in the game. Thirdly, effective suggestions for promoting joint investment were proposed by controlling factors such as cooperation benefits, cooperation costs, risk coefficients, default coefficients, and government subsidies in the investment project parameters. This study provides useful references for resource allocation and risk management decision-making in new research and development institutions.

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张智颖,廖兵.科技自立自强背景下新型研发机构与社会资本联合投资策略研究 ——基于动态博弈模型的理论分析[J].,2024,44(15).

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  • 收稿日期:2024-02-21
  • 最后修改日期:2024-03-28
  • 录用日期:2024-04-23
  • 在线发布日期: 2025-03-19
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