Abstract:The acquisition of groundbreaking research outcomes by scientists is fundamentally contingent upon the provision of scientific funding, with the funding framework serving as a critical catalyst for the progressive advancement of scientific inquiry. Nonetheless, in the context of escalating research investments, instances of latent research misconduct, including the recurrent submission of proposals by investigators, are increasingly prevalent, and the issue of redundant project endorsements persists unabated. Repeated funding in scientific projects involving misconduct is a significant cause of waste in scientific and technological resources. There is an urgent need to clarify the governance logic behind this phenomenon to achieve optimal resource allocation. To this end, this study focuses on the project application and approval stages, utilizing a dual principal-agent model involving funding agencies, host institutions, and researchers. It analyzes the impact of factors such as the urgency of project demand, the level of indirect benefits, and the intensity of supervision on the source governance of repeated funding. Additionally, the potential effects of various governance elements are simulated. The findings reveal that researchers' behavior of violating regulations by submitting duplicate applications is positively correlated with the urgency of their project demand. An increase in the proportion of indirect costs highlights the importance of high-intensity supervision by funding agencies. In terms of governance methods, direct governance by funding agencies targeting individuals is more effective than indirect management through host institutions. Therefore, funding agencies should further enhance the intensity of supervision and strengthen source governance targeting researchers to fundamentally prevent the occurrence of repeated funding.