突发事件应急科普中政府和公众的演化状态与博弈关系分析

The Evolution State and Game Relationship Analysis of Governments and the Public in Emergency Science Communication

摘要:

完善应急科普建设是强化公众风险防范意识，夯实应急管理工作基础，构筑社会安全体系的重要保障。为厘清政府和公众在突发事件应急科普中的演化状态和博弈关系，构建突发事件应急科普的随机演化博弈模型，并通过数值仿真探讨在随机因素扰动下影响突发事件应急科普效能的关键因素。研究表明：加强专家参与科普活动力度与政府部门间的联动效率有利于形成政府积极部署与公众主动接受的科普实践局面。同时，公众安全防护意识过高和过低会出现迟滞疏忽和盲目自信两种现象，均不利于应急科普效率提升。此外，科普信息的传播范围对政府和公众的策略演化轨迹产生反向影响。

Abstract:

Enhancing the construction of emergency science communication is an important guarantee for strengthening public risk awareness, consolidating the foundation of emergence management and building the system of social security. In order to clarify the evolutionary state and game relationship between the government and the public in emergency science communication, the research constructed a stochastic evolutionary game model of emergency science communication for sudden incidents. Furthermore, key factors affecting the effectiveness of emergency science communication under the disturbance of stochastic factors were explored through numerical simulations. The results indicate that enhancing the participation of experts and improving the coordination efficiency between government departments contributes to form a situation of science communication practice where the government positively deploys and the public proactively accepts. Meanwhile, both excessively high and low levels of public safety awareness can lead to two undesirable phenomena which are "delayed response" and "blind overconfidence,, and neither of these is conducive to improving the effectiveness of emergency science communication. In addition, the dissemination range of scientific information has a reverse impact on the strategic evolutionary trajectory of both the government and the public.