重大工程协同创新策略的随机演化决策分析

Stochastic Evolutionary Decision Analysis of Collaborative Innovation Strategies for Megaprojects

摘要:

重大基础设施工程的高风险和显著不确定性,给项目的顺利实施带来了严峻挑战,促进协同创新是解决创新难题的关键所在。针对重大工程协同创新的高度不确定性和主体行为动机的突变性问题,从业主参与视角,构建业主、承包方和学研方的随机演化博弈模型,分析三方的演化稳定策略和演化过程。研究表明:随机干扰强度与主体策略选择波动成正比,业主具有较好的稳定性,学研方表现出最大的波动性；监管的强度系数越大,成本越高,业主参与协同创新的积极性越低；奖惩措施可以有效促进三方主体参与协同创新,均对惩罚措施的敏感性更高；协同创新溢出的风险越高,承包方和学研方选择协同创新策略的意愿越低。

Abstract:

The significant risks and considerable uncertainty associated with major infrastructure projects pose serious challenges to their successful implementation. Promoting collaborative innovation is key to addressing the difficulties of innovation. In response to the high uncertainty and variability of stakeholder behavior in collaborative innovation for megaprojects, the stochastic evolutionary game model involving the owner, the contractor, and the research institution is constructed from the perspective of owners. This model analyzes the evolutionary stable strategies and processes of the three parties. The study shows that the intensity of stochastic disturbances is positively correlated with the fluctuation in strategy selection by the stakeholders, with the owner demonstrating relatively greater stability and the research institution exhibiting the highest volatility. The higher the intensity coefficient of regulation, the higher the cost, and the lower the enthusiasm of the owner to participate in collaborative innovation. Reward and punishment measures can effectively promote the participation of all three parties in collaborative innovation, with all parties showing higher sensitivity to punishment measures. Moreover, the higher the risk of collaborative innovation spillovers, the lower the willingness of the contractor and the research institution to choose collaborative innovation strategies.