政府监管与企业趋利：数据安全监管机制的演化博弈分析

Government Regulation and Corporate Convergence: An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Data Security Regulatory Mechanisms

摘要:

近年来，企业数据安全问题频发且对国家安全构成严重威胁。尽管国家已颁布多项政策法规，但数据安全监管仍面临问题发现难、调查取证难、管理成本高等多重挑战，且因企业逐利本性致使政府监管与企业逐利形成二元博弈态势，进一步加大政府安全监管的难度；而现有研究对于政府和企业二元主题的博弈研究较为少见。为此，从政府发挥主导作用的宏观视角切入，通过引入演化博弈理论，进行静态博弈场景与动态博弈态势分析，并确定监管成功率、第三方举报概率等10项策略影响参数，宏观分析政府监管与企业趋利博弈的进化稳定态势，从政府资源有限视角给出监管企业数据安全的最佳机制路径。结果发现：第三方参与意识不足会造成政府和企业在不良状态中形成不良循环，同时对企业惩罚的适度性也极为重要；在杜绝企业因不注重数据安全而引发风险时，不仅需要政府监管时对企业进行有效惩罚，也需要企业或民众对不注重数据安全行为的举报与监督。最后，结合政府资源有限视角提出协作路径、资源路径、政策路径、信息路径4类12条监管机制进路。

Abstract:

In recent years, frequent corporate data security incidents have posed a serious threat to national security. Despite the enactment of multiple policies and regulations, data security supervision still faces multiple challenges, including difficulty in problem identification, investigation and evidence collection, and high management costs. Moreover, the profit-seeking nature of enterprises leads to a binary game between government regulation and corporate profit-seeking, further increasing the difficulty of government security supervision. Existing research on the binary game between government and corporate entities is relatively scarce. Therefore, this study adopts a macro perspective with the government playing a leading role, introduces evolutionary game theory, and conducts static and dynamic game analysis. It identifies 10 strategic impact parameters, including regulatory success rate and the probability of third-party reporting, to macroscopically analyze the evolutionary stable state of the game between government regulation and corporate profit-seeking. From the perspective of limited government resources, the study proposes the optimal mechanism for regulating corporate data security. The results reveal that insufficient awareness of third-party participation can lead to a vicious cycle between government and enterprises in adverse states, and the appropriateness of corporate punishment is also crucial. To prevent risks caused by enterprises' neglect of data security, effective punishment from government regulation is needed, as well as reporting and supervision by enterprises or the public on behaviors that neglect data security. Finally, combining the perspective of limited government resources, the study proposes four types of regulatory mechanisms, including collaborative, resource, policy, and information pathways, with a total of 12 regulatory approaches.